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The article comments on some aspects of the present economic crisis. The role of bonuses 
in a system with principal-agent relationship is discussed. Several other features like the 
responsibility of rating institutes are considered. A main point is to question our knowledge 
about the crisis. New developments in economics take soft  factors into account. These 
factors and the fact that at most “bounded rationality” guides human action throw some 
doubt on ready-to-hand judgments. 
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The present economic crisis is intensively discussed in newspapers, journals, and internet. 
All who are concerned follow the discussion; and this is the bulk of the population, the 
greater part because they are worried about their economic situation, and the smaller part 
because  they  bear  responsibility.  Lots  of  experts  and  politicians  propose  remedies. 
Unfortunately the recipes are rarely congruent and sometimes even contradictory. Experts, 
of course, must appear convinced and convincing if they want to become consultants of 
politicians. Yet we may ask how profound our knowledge about what has happened is. 
There is nevertheless much agreement as to the main reasons of the crisis. We will here 
accept these core features. Less agreement is observed with respect to the details especially 
with respect to the weight to be put on the different causes, and about what is to do. The 
striking point, however, is that most of the agreement is ex post; before the crisis hardly 
anybody was aware of the fatal development. The few who were warning were neglected 
(Schiller R., 2005). Are there not always some experts who see dangers? The author of this 
paper  has  a  skeptical  attitude  and  does  not  pretend  to  know  affairs  better  than  others. 
Speculation and economic collapses have accompanied mankind through history. They will 
appear in future, too. The best we can do is to make them less severe. To achieve this a few 
aspects of the problem are to be discussed in the sequel. 
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1. The Genesis of the Crisis 
The origin of all the trouble is the US- American housing market. This is certainly only one 
market in one specific nation. Yet it is a very big market in the world’s largest economy 
with  the  international  key  currency.  How  could  this  special  market  disturb  the  world 
economy so deeply? The sequence of events is the following. From about 2002 the US 
housing  market  boomed.  Prices  went  up  steadily.  The  belief  in  permanently  increasing 
prices for real estate in future was  widely spread. The boom was fostered by the low-
interest-policy of the Federal Reserve Bank (Schiller R., 2008, p.50).  
Even those parts of the population who never had thought of living in their own homes took 
advantage of low credit costs and bought houses. The finance sector made this possible also 
by lowering the standards for housing credits. The risk of insolvency of borrowers seemed 
low as long as real estate prices continued their upward rally. So many people received a 
credit who did not comply with traditional requirements. They formed the subprime sector 
of mortgages.  
In fall 2007 mortgage rates increased. Many new home owners had no fixed mortgages 
rates. They were not able to pay the higher rates and were driven into insolvency. The result 
was a great number of foreclosures against home owners (Schiller R., 2008, p.51). As a 
consequence the supply of homes went up and the prices for housing went down. The 
bubble burst. The hope of continuing price increases was disappointed. It was not merely 
the carelessness of banks (that should have known it better) and house owners (who were 
badly advised) but there were also changes in the economic situation that caused the risks 
to become reality.  
Exactly this happened. The American housing market was driven by a speculative bubble 
that could not withstand the challenges of the market and finally burst. So far the subprime 
crisis is a purely  American  problem. The immediate impact of the  American subprime 
crisis on the rest of the world at least the Western world is, however, the most interesting 
feature of the event. The impact seems to be even more all-embracing and faster than the 
proliferation of the Great Depression from 1928 to 1933. One aspect of globalization is 
demonstrated here. Financing the boom was made easy by the cheap-money policy of the 
Federal Reserve System. Banks used their existing assets of mortgages to expand.  
This is unprecedented in financial history. In a first step the banks sold the mortgages to 
securitize thus changing them in tradable bonds. Mortgages formed the basis of a manifold 
of arcane financial products. Not many people did understand them and their risks, least 
those who bought them. After all subprime mortgages formed an essential part of these 
papers.  In  a  second  step  banks  used  the  revenue  out  of  the  sales  of  mortgage-based 
securities and took additionally cheap money from the market thus using leverage effects to 
expand the volume of real estate credits. This money again was invested in new mortgages. 
The procedure was repeated again and again. (Figure no. 1)  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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Figure no. 1: Anatomy of the bubble 
 
This describes a vicious circle that caused a gigantic volume of credits. We may call it the 
anatomy of the bubble. Anyway a great number of doubtful papers came into circulation 
and the public was not informed of their quality. The present discussion has its focus on 
this  lack  of  information  or  even  misguidance.  Finally  trustful  investors  financed  the 
American real estate boom. Among them were not only American investment banks and 
insurance  companies  but  also  investors  from  around  the  world.  English,  French  and 
German  banks  lost  huge  amounts  of  money  when  the  bubble  burst.  Government 
intervention in the United States and several European countries prevented the banking 
systems from collapsing. Hence the taxpayer has to pay.  
The  crisis  is  no  longer  only  an  American  problem.  The  losses  of  national  speculative 
bubbles  are  partly  internationalized,  again  a  consequence  of  globalisation.  The  rating 
agencies are criticized for their double function on the one hand as advisers and on the 
other  hand  as  rating  analysts  giving  top  ratings  to  subprime  papers 
(www.marketoracle.co.uk). The high reputation of these institutes misled the public and 
deceived customers including banks that looked for profitable investment. During the 2009 
election campaign in Germany all parties took up this line of criticism, and postulated the 
separation of the two functions of rating agencies (***, IWD). It is difficult to belief that 
professionals  in  the  banking  industry  were  not  aware  of  the  fallacies  of  the  system. 
Nevertheless  most of them acted in good faith. They  were carried away by a  wave  of 
optimism. How far can we trust professionals? 
 
2. Why does the Financial Sector impair the whole Economy? 
All these considerations may explain a crisis of the international banking system. Now a 
question may be raised: How could the banking crises inflict damage on the real economy? 
As a consequence of the crisis banks distrusted one another and became reluctant with 
credits to anybody. This general distrust can explain part of it but not all. There are other 
reasons, too. The reminiscence of the Great Depression (1928-1933) is still present. The 
economic problems at that time started also within the financial sector of the United States 
and spread from there all over the world. A stock crash 1928 marked the beginning of the 
long-lasting  period  of  low-level  economic  activity.  Most  people  are  now  convinced  by 
analogy that again a deep depression is impending presumably less severe and less lasting 
than the Great Depression since governments will behave – hopefully – more reasonable. Is 
this really true? Perhaps! Yet we do not really know. Quite a few indicators of the United AE  Some Aspects of the Economic Crisis 
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States and also of the major European economies suggest that the worst may be over. The 
decided actions of the economically leading nations to mitigate the crisis have certainly had 
an effect on the real and on the psychological level. Even more effectual the international 
cooperation  might  have  proved.  Here  we  observe  distinctive  differences  between  the 
present situation and that during the Great Depression. We do not know, however, to what 
extent political action has improved the real situation and to what extent it has influenced 
the atmosphere and created a more optimistic attitude. It is difficult to assess the magnitude 
of  the  effects  of  political  action,  especially  in  advance.  This  is  again  a  gap  in  our 
knowledge.  These  arguments  are  not  as  strict  as  economists  like  them.  They  are 
notwithstanding of some weight. They reveal the psychological dimension of economic 
beliefs  and  decisions.  Confidence  in  long-lasting  increases  of  real  estate  values  and 
pessimism concerning the economic activity of the future has something in common: They 
represent soft factors influencing hard facts. 
Traditional theoretical economists did not deny psychological factors but they neglected 
them more than is adequate. They preferred to explain the economic world (and parts of it) 
on  the  basis  of  observable  phenomena  and  the  overall  assumption  of  rational  people 
(“homini oeconomici”). Practical economists were always aware of soft factors and the 
successful among them used to draw advantage out of their knowledge (?) or instinct (?). 
The modern movement of experimental economics tries to find out actual human behaviour 
as composed of rational and non-rational elements. The idea of a completely rational man 
who is able to analyse all situations completely is given up because it goes beyond human 
abilities. A really astute man knows about his deficiencies. He tries to be “reasonable” 
instead of rational. This is the idea of “bounded rationality” (Simon H.A., 1957). Human 
decisions are rational as far as the best choice is obvious. Otherwise people follow other 
rules (e.g. rules of thumb, common practice, heuristics, and instinct). Such a philosophy 
leaves space for emotional reactions and believes. There are certainly rules behind such 
behaviour, but it is not easy to find them out. The rules may have a “human component” 
(valid for human beings everywhere) and a “cultural component” (valid only for members 
of a specific culture or even social group). The financial sector is a cultural milieu with 
similar rules all over the world and is by far more unified than other economic sectors. This 
is so because the financial sector is more internationalized than any other economic sector. 
Even within the financial sector the image of soberly calculating bankers does not meet 
reality. Psychological factors are present besides the rational ones. Numerous stock market 
reports with pictures like “bull market” or “bear market” demonstrate this. It has not been 
since recently that new insights into human behaviour on a theoretical and empirical level 
have found their way in more practical discussions. Akerlof and Shiller (Akerlof G.A., 
Schiller  R.J.,  2009)  use  those  modern  contributions  and  insights  in  order  to  draw  the 
necessary consequences. Traditional economic argumentation neglected the psychological 
dimension to explain the economic reality. Great economists have often referred to human 
psychology. So did John M. Keynes when he introduced “animal spirits” as a factor of 
human  economic  acting  (Keynes  J.M.,  1973,  pp.148-151).  Akerlof  and  Shiller  resume 
Keynes’ approach and apply it to practical situations, also to the crisis. We may interpret 
“animal spirits” here as a compound of soft factors (rules of fairness, rules of behaviour, 
convictions, instinct, etc.) that are not derived from rational thinking. They also use results 
of experimental economics. Their concept is actually one of bounded rationality extended 
even  by  some  elements  of  irrationality  prevailing  in  the  real  world.  The  present  crisis 
inspired  them  for  many  comments  and  discussions  (Akerlof  G.A.,  Schiller  R.J.,  2009,  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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pp.86-89). The argumentation differs greatly from traditional discussions of the problems, 
and throws much light on the drives behind the financial sector and much doubt on many of 
our traditional views. 
 
3. Some Theoretical Considerations 
One of the key problems in the public discussion around the  financial crisis is that  of 
bonuses (derstandard.at). Consider a banker (owner of a bank) who has to choose between 
long  run  and  short  run  success.  Normally  these  are  conflicting  objectives.  A  maximal 
immediate success  may  well reduce long-run  gains. This is so because  such a  strategy 
implies  ruthless  behaviour  against  customers  and  partners  adverse  to  a  long-run 
relationship. A lack of fair dealing may well serve short-run goals and endanger long-run 
success. Business friends will not accept this, and not cooperate in future. 
Moreover it is not reasonable to use every present chance. Waiting for future opportunities 
is often the better choice. The economic principle requires the best choice for the long run 
and not a maximum choice of the present period. On the whole it is not optimal to use all 
possibilities at once. An optimal intertemporal allocation will avoid myopic depletion of 
resources. Suppose a banker tries to maximize immediate profits, then he will be forced to 
postpone long run chances. If he aims at long-run profit maximization he must not use 
every opportunity to earn quick money. We depict the situation by a diagram (Figure no. 2). 
Simplifying the argument we distinguish only two periods, the “short run” and the “long 
run” (profit discounted for the present period). The relationship between the short-run and 
the  long-run  profits  is  represented  by  the  curve  AA’.  The  curve  is  supposed  to  be 
monotonously decreasing and convex. That means taking care for the future should not 
prevent from making the best out of present chances: A trade-off is asked. 
 
 
Figure no. 2: Short run versus long run profits 
 
The owner of the bank, say the principal, will decide according a trade-off between short-
run and long-run profits. The optimal choice is given by a situation where the marginal 
discounted long –run profit equals the marginal short-run profit. Any additional immediate 
gain is compensated by long-run losses. In Fig. 1 this is the point where the AA’-curve has AE  Some Aspects of the Economic Crisis 
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a  gradient  of  45o,  the  equilibrium  point.  The  AA’-curve  is  not  precisely  known.  The 
judgment of the decider will vary in time and space. An objection to the arguments may 
that it is not very probable that the description given here depicts the way of thinking either 
of the principal or the agent. In some way or other, however, they both have presentations 
of the relationship in their mental maps that are more or less equivalent to the model here. 
Of  course,  the  agents  have  no  concise  idea  of  the  future.  They  have,  however,  some 
expectations, and they must have. These, of course, are widely influenced by soft factors. If 
they no view of the future situation they could not plan at all. The ideas they have may be 
wrong, and this was obviously so in the time before the crisis but they did exist.  
The principal is usually a corporation that acts by employees, say agents (Eisenhardt K., 
2005).  Hence  we  have  a  principal-agent  problem.  The  interests  of  the  agent  need  not 
coincide with that of the principal. Indeed, if there are bonuses paid for the short-run period 
the agent will have a bias for immediate gains and decide for a point left of the equilibrium 
point. So the long run profits are depleted more than the short-run profits increase. Reasons 
for a short-run preference are the following: The risks of the bank are common risks of the 
principal and the agent as far as both are motivated by profits, provided bonuses follow the 
short-run gains. Beyond these risks the agent bears additional imponderables. The future is 
uncertain. On the one hand the agent’s personal position may change; on the other hand the 
agent is not accountable for losses of the bank in the long run. Under these circumstances it 
is perfectly rational  for the  agents to choose a point  left of the equilibrium point. The 
principals are responsible for conditions that guide the behaviour of agents and finally pay a 
lot of money for it. Suppose for simplicity that the shape of the AA’-curve is given. A more 
optimistic view of the future could then be expressed by a shift of the curve to the right: 
AA’→BB’(Figure no. 3). 
 
 
Figure no. 3: Shift of long run versus short run profit 
 
The optimal point, too, is shifted to the right which means that the short-run policy, and 
therefore the corresponding short-run profit as preferred by principals is unchanged. The 
question  is  whether  agents  with  a  bias  to  high  short-run  profits  will  be  influenced  by  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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expectations. Agents usually want to have success. Success is good for their reputation and 
their professional future. Therefore they certainly want to avoid future losses or poor profits 
for their principal. Although this is true the interests of agent and principal are not identical. 
Bonuses will cause agents to perform a trade-off between their short-run interests and their 
principal’s long-run interests. Now it is possible to assess the effects of expectations. An 
agent who expects a favourable business climate will be inclined to strongly stress the 
present opportunities even if long-run profits are alleviated. This argument stays valid for 
situations where the agent recognizes some risks for the future. Here it is quite natural to 
exploit the chances of today. Human nature is corrupt in a very subtle way. Why should an 
agent not use the chances of a bull market where his colleagues and competitors show 
optimism – even if he has some doubts? 
Boom and depression have a psychological dimension. A single agent can hardly withstand 
the challenge of such phases of economic activity. The result of this reasoning: Agents are 
more  prone  to  use  the  chances  of  the  day  (neglecting  long-run  disadvantages)  than 
principals  that  act  in  their  own  responsibility.  Corporations  are  therefore  more  readily 
trapped  into  the  fallacies  of  a  boom  than  small  and  medium-sized  businesses.  The 
discrepancy  between  the  interests  of  shareholders  (not  only  of  banks)  in  their  role  as 
principals and managers as their agents is striking. An explanation for this phenomenon is 
given  by  the  fact  that  shareholders  and  managers  are  not  partners  that  negotiate  some 
contract between them. Actually the contract is negotiated between agents in the role of the 
principal since a corporation is not able to decide and other agents who run the business. 
The contract between principal and agent is therefore a contract among agents. Agents have 
an interest to negotiate favourable conditions for their class. 
 
Conclusions 
Which conclusions can we draw from foregoing considerations? It is possible to take care 
that some of the obvious shortcomings of the financial system will be removed. The state 
should set a few convincing rules and otherwise not intervene into the market. The state is a 
bad banker. In Germany mainly the public banks were hit by the crises. Their behavior 
should therefore not be made a benchmark. There are many possibilities to achieve what is 
required. It should be made sure that the following principles will prevail:  
·  The  practice  of  bonuses  ought  to  be  reformed  such  that  managers  become 
motivated by long-run profits. Managers of corporations  are in the position of 
entrepreneurs. Successful entrepreneurs may expect high profits. This should be 
true  for  successful  agents  in  the  role  of  entrepreneurs,  too.  The  function  of 
entrepreneurs, however, also is to bear risks. He who receives high remuneration is 
able to take over risks. Bonuses are not too high but have taken on the character of 
riskless rents.  
·  The information of the public must be improved. The rating system should be 
extended. More institutions should be periodically checked, more detailed results 
should reach the public. Securities must be analysed with respect to the connected 
risks.  
·  Banks must be obliged to give full information to their customers. This is to be 
required especially with respect to the modern style bonds with hidden risks that AE  Some Aspects of the Economic Crisis 
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are new in history. It is necessary to develop rules for accountancy of the bank if 
information had been deficient.  
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